In recent years, a growing number of studies have researchers opting to use "real" e¤ort designs for laboratory experiments where subjects complete an actual task to exert e¤ort rather than using what is perhaps a more traditional design of stylized e¤ort where subjects simply choose an e¤ort level from a pre-de…ned set. The commonly argued reason for real e¤ort is that it makes the results more generalizable and …eld relevant. Some researchers go further and make a distinction between trivial and useful real e¤ort, i.e. whether the task is only relevant for the experiment or if it leads to tangible production for some purpose outside of the experiment, and claim that the useful e¤ort model is even more likely to be generalizable. We present an experiment designed to test whether these three modes of e¤ort, stylized, trivial, and useful, have any impact on behavior in a public goods setting. We …nd that all three forms of e¤ort lead to identical decision making and then discuss how these results help to inform us about the use of real e¤ort in laboratory experiments.
Introduction
There are many di¤erent forms of economic experiments in which researchers want experimental subjects to engage in tasks modeled after …eld tasks that involve expenditures of e¤ort. This includes principal-agent games or other workplace related decision making environments in which a researcher wants to understand how di¤erent incentive structures or environmental features a¤ect e¤ort decisions. It also includes many other standard environments such as coordination games, trust games, and public goods games. This makes the manner in which e¤ort is modeled of key importance to the design of a very wide range of experiments.
Traditionally there are two di¤erent ways that one might consider modeling e¤ort. We will refer to the …rst as "real e¤ort"where subjects perform a task that involves some degree of actual e¤ort and the second as "stylized e¤ort"where a subject chooses some e¤ort level from a given set of alternatives. The stylized e¤ort design is essentially an analog of the structure found in theoretical models involving e¤ort choice. In the stylized e¤ort approach one might allow a subject to choose e¤ort on the range of [0; 10] with higher numbers resulting in a higher cost to the subject than lower numbers. The function de…ning the cost of any level of e¤ort is therefore induced and under the control of the experimenter. This induced cost function is intended to capture the important aspects of actual physical and mental exertion in which a person chooses how much e¤ort to exert and higher e¤ort levels are assumed to involve higher mental or physical costs.
In a real e¤ort design, the experimenter will have the subjects complete a task such as solving math problems which require actual physical or mental exertion. In these situations, a researcher assumes that there is some cost to the subject of completing the task but the nature of the cost function is unknown and typically not under the control of the experimenter. 1 To the extent that the induced cost function in a stylized e¤ort design captures the cost function in the real e¤ort task, one would expect similar behavior in the two environments. If, however, an induced cost function is not a good match with the cost function in the real e¤ort task, then one should not expect comparable results. Also, if the cost function in the real e¤ort task does not match the one assumed in a theoretical model of behavior, one should also not expect the behavior in the real e¤ort task to match with the theoretical predictions. These points regarding the importance of matching cost functions across contexts are important and yet are commonly ignored in the literature on real e¤ort experiments. They will be a central issue in what we discuss in the current study.
Early experiments that involved subjects engaging in e¤ort were mostly done using the stylized e¤ort design (extensive examples can be found in various literature reviews such as Kuhn and Charness (2011) for labor experiments, Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhuri (2011) for public goods, Devetag and Ortmann (2007) for coordination games, and Johnson and Mislin (2011) for trust games). Recently there has been a substantial shift towards experimenters preferring real e¤ort designs. In attempting to understand the issues behind why one would choose one model or the other, we will …rst review some of the advantages and disadvantages claimed in the literature for the di¤erent ways of modeling e¤ort in the lab.
The stylized e¤ort approach has one clear advantage in its favor: control. By using the stylized e¤ort approach one can establish a very tight connection between the experimental set-up and the underlying theory. For example, in a theoretical model of a principalagent game, the agent is modeled as choosing an e¤ort level and facing a cost function which translates the e¤ort choice into a monetary equivalent cost. The stylized e¤ort implementation in the lab is identical. This allows an experimenter precise control over the cost of a subject's e¤ort which also allows for the ability to manipulate that cost function as needed. Ultimately this allows for the speci…cation and testing of precise hypotheses regarding behavior. This tight connection with the theory also helps to develop a clear understanding for when and perhaps why individual behavior di¤ers from those theoretical predictions. Another advantage of this approach is that the time commitment involved in these experiments is typically less than in real e¤ort experiments which allows the researcher greater ‡exibility in the topics which can be covered in a typical experiment.
When moving to a real e¤ort design, the cost function is uncontrolled by the experimenter. This loss of control leads to a diminished connection to theory. Consequently, one can often not make precise predictions regarding behavior which makes it more di¢ -cult to identify deviations from theoretical predictions and determine their nature. There are, however, claims about advantages from the real e¤ort approach which explain why people use it. A good example of the claimed advantage is found in Kuhn and Charness (2011) ,"Concerning the objection that the labor task is abstract and arti…cial, there has been an increasing trend in 'real-e¤ort'experiments...."The claim here is that the increase in the use of real e¤ort designs is due to the fact that they help make the experiments less abstract and arti…cial. Similarly Van Dijk, Sonnemans, and Van Winden (2001) state that real e¤ort "involves e¤ort, fatigue, boredom, excitement and other a¤ectations not present in the abstract experiments."Their conjecture is that subjects would be willing to work for more hours than if they give the equivalent amount of money to a charity -a conjecture which was supported in Brown, Meer, and Williams (2013) . Corgnet, Hernán-González, and Rassenti (2011) further argue that a real e¤ort design helps overcome a problem with laboratory experiments claimed by Falk and Heckman (2009) which is that "There is also a widespread view that the lab produces unrealistic data, which lacks relevance for understanding the 'real world'." This view is crystallized in Gill and Prowse (2011) when the authors state that "The main advantage of using a real e¤ort task over a monetary cost function is the greater external validity of the experiment, which increases with how closely exerting e¤ort in the task replicates the exertion of e¤ort outside of the laboratory."While other studies using real e¤ort designs don't always state this argument so explicitly, they usually make the same claim or a similar one implicitly which is that somehow the real e¤ort speci…cation is a better match with the …eld. One noticeable failing in most of these studies, though, is the failure to provide a clear argument for why this would be the case or to provide empirical validation for the claim. Both are important points to establish in order to better understand the issue of how to best model e¤ort in an experiment.
As an attempt to establish those points, we can start by trying to understand the logical arguments for why real e¤ort designs might be more externally valid. One argument for why a speci…c task in an experiment would generalize to the …eld would be that the cost function of that task shares important characteristics with the …eld task and these costs cannot be captured in a more controlled setting. To make such a claim one would have to put forward the argument that the cost function of the lab task, e.g. aligning sliders, has the same characteristics of the cost functions in the …eld tasks such as mail room workers sorting packages, lawyers taking a case to trial or doctors diagnosing patients. This does not appear to be the argument advanced in many papers in the literature possibly because it would be di¢ cult to support. For example, Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) study gender di¤erences in competitive environments where subjects solve mazes. There is no discussion of what task in the …eld has a cost function that is well captured by solving mazes. Charness and Villeval (2009) also use a real e¤ort task of completing anagrams to examine how age in ‡uences competitive preferences and again it isn't made clear what …eld competitive environment has the same e¤ort cost function as constructing anagrams. Johnson and Salmon (2016) have subjects solve math problems to represent workplace promotion tournaments but do not provide any argument for why the cost function for solving math problems is a good proxy for that of any speci…c workplace behavior. While these real e¤ort tasks all involve physical or mental exertion they are also still quite abstract in terms of how they represent the corresponding …eld situations. These papers are no di¤erent than others on this issue and the point is simply that while this seems to be the most obvious way one might support the external validity claim, few seem to use it as their rationale.
An alternative argument is that real e¤ort tasks, by their nature of involving actual mental or physical exertion, are able to trigger certain types of behavior that a stylized design would not be able to. In Ku and Salmon (2012) , the authors argue that the reason for choosing real e¤ort over a stylized e¤ort design is due to the belief that subjects might form more of an emotional connection to their e¤ort choices if they represent real e¤ort than if they are simply chosen from a number line. In Fahr and Irlenbusch (2000) , subjects crack walnuts to earn their endowment in a trust game because they "wanted the working task to make the workers su¤er to a certain extent in order to guarantee that they really felt entitled to the property rights." Again, these are just examples of a common theme found in the literature and while there is certainly intuitive logic to these claims, they are typically just asserted and are not tested.
Some researchers who are concerned about the abstract nature of even these real e¤ort designs go even further and argue that there should be a distinction between what we will refer to as "trivial" versus "useful" real e¤ort. Trivial real e¤ort would be an experiment design in which the e¤ort from the subjects is relevant only for the internal purposes of the experiment. Aligning sliders or solving math problems and mazes would all be examples of trivial e¤ort as these tasks have no relevance outside of the laboratory. To circumvent this issue, other real e¤ort tasks involve having subjects do things like stu¤ envelopes that will be used for o¢ cial department business (Carpenter, Liati, and Vickery (2010) ) or cracking nuts that are used in a grocery store's holiday cookies (Fahr and Irlenbusch (2000) ). This e¤ort is useful since the subjects are engaging in tasks that yield tangible output which is relevant outside of the laboratory. In these experiments, subjects are almost employees and so they could see it as a close analog to an actual job. This useful e¤ort approach to modeling e¤ort in the lab is a very small step from a …eld experiment and some argue that it is the best way to model e¤ort in the lab. An important caveat is that if one claims that the only way to generalize to the …eld is to match the tasks precisely then this implicitly involves a claim that envelope stu¢ ng experiments only apply to very similar settings in the …eld in which people engage in simple repetitive and menial o¢ ce tasks. Thus this argument can actually be seen as an argument for limits on the generalizability of experiments to the …eld rather than arguing that experiments based on subjects shelling nuts generalize to a broader set of …eld situations.
We have demonstrated that while many prior studies advance claims regarding the di¤erent approaches to modeling e¤ort in an experiment, the validity of those claims has not been …rmly established. In order to validate these claims, two empirical points must be established:
1. The type of e¤ort in an experiment design has a direct e¤ect on the behavior of subjects.
2. If the behavior in real e¤ort is di¤erent than stylized e¤ort, then the behavior generated by the real e¤ort designs does a better job of matching with observed behavior in related …eld contexts.
The second point is perhaps the more important one but before investigating it, it is necessary to establish the validity of the …rst. There have been a few prior studies which have begun to address the …rst point but they have not been able to provide conclusive answers. Bortolotti, Devetag, and Ortmann (2009) examine a weak link game with real e¤ort and …nd results quite di¤erent from many stylized e¤ort experiments suggesting that indeed real and stylized e¤ort yield di¤erent behaviors. However, the real e¤ort task they use has a cost function with unknown properties which is unlikely to match the properties of the induced cost function for the stylized e¤ort treatment. Consequently it isn't clear if the di¤erences are due to the type of e¤ort or due to di¤erences in the cost functions. Brüggen and Strobel (2007) examine the issue in the context of gift exchange games and …nd no di¤erence, but again the cost functions between the two environments are uncontrolled so whether there should be di¤erences is unclear. Lezzi, Fleming, and Zizzo (2015) compare three di¤erent real e¤ort tasks with an induced e¤ort version and …nd substantial di¤erences in how people respond to them. This is perhaps similar to results found in Dutcher (2012) where di¤erent results were obtained between two di¤erent real e¤ort tasks in which one required creative thinking while the other did not. One might conclude that these studies provide conclusive evidence that real e¤ort changes behavior since behavior changes across real e¤ort tasks. That would only be a valid conclusion if the cost of e¤ort functions between these tasks were identical. There seems little reason to believe that they were and so a better interpretation of those results is that they con…rm our point made above regarding how di¤erent cost functions yield di¤erent results.
This now allows us to state very clearly the question that will be the subject of our study: is there a di¤ erence in behavior between real e¤ ort and stylized e¤ ort experiments which can be attributed purely to the di¤ erence in the manner in which e¤ ort is modeled?
We have chosen to investigate this question in the context of public goods games. There are multiple reasons why the public goods game is a useful context in which to test this issue. First, the stylized facts of public goods games with chosen e¤ort have been replicated numerous times in the literature and are well known, see again Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhuri (2011) . Thus we have a very strong baseline expectation of what behavior should be like in real e¤ort versions of this game. Second, we will be able to use the context of the public goods environment to maintain careful control of the cost function across contexts, which we have already noted is vital to testing this issue. Third, one reason why real e¤ort may lead to di¤erential behaviors, as noted in prior literature, is that individuals may feel more attached to their earnings from the output of a real e¤ort game and the public goods game provides an excellent vehicle to detect such di¤erences. If individuals feel more entitled to their earnings in a real e¤ort context then it seems likely that they will react more harshly to group members that are contributing a lesser amount and therefore contributions might be lower in a real e¤ort setting or they might decay faster. Further, the di¤erences between trivial and useful e¤ort may be highlighted here as well as engaging in useful e¤ort could be seen as already providing some sort of public good, which could lead to individuals becoming more or less inclined towards cooperation.
Testing our question requires us to design an experiment in which we will vary the nature of e¤ort provision across treatments between stylized, trivial and useful e¤ort. Doing this requires us to design a public goods game that will have several novel elements compared to standard public goods games and standard real e¤ort experiments. These elements are necessary to ensure that the only thing that varies between treatments is how e¤ort is elicited from the subjects. In the next section we provide a detailed explanation of our experimental design, including an explanation regarding why each element is required.
Experiment Design
Our experiment is designed to determine if the nature of e¤ort will have a signi…cant impact on observed behavior. This turns out to be a non-trivial issue to investigate as switching from a standard stylized e¤ort design to a standard real e¤ort design involves changing a number of important aspects of the environment other than the nature of the e¤ort itself, many of which could a¤ect behavior. We will explain these issues as we explain some of the key aspects of the design.
Our design is based on the standard model of a VCM used in many laboratory experiments dating back to Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984) and Isaac and Walker (1988) . As explained in Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhuri (2011) , this basic design has been used to investigate many issues about public good provision and the base results have been replicated many times. Our design will use as its base the exact same incentive structure as these classic VCM designs and our treatments will involve varying how subjects receive the tokens they will be investing in the VCM, while attempting to control all other factors.
The core of all of the treatments possess the same incentive structure. Participants are randomly assigned to a group of 4 and remain matched for the duration of the experiment session. In each period of the session, individual subjects have 10 tokens and can invest these tokens into either an individual private account or a group account. For each token invested in the individual account, the participant earns $0.20. For each token contributed to the group account, the group earns $0.40. These group earnings are divided equally between all 4 group members ($0.10 per group member), leading to a marginal per capital return (MPCR) of 0.5. At the end of the period, participants are provided with feedback that includes a reminder of their contributions to the individual account and group account, the total number of tokens donated by all members of the group to the group account, and a summary of their earnings for the period. This same process was repeated in every period for a total of 10 periods.
In order to address our research question we had to implement these incentives with both real and stylized e¤ort. A typical approach to a real e¤ort version of a public goods game might have players solving math problems or other real e¤ort task and have the capability to generate earnings either for their group or just for themselves. 2 One immediate di¤erence between these designs and the standard VCM is that the production of the subjects in the real e¤ort versions is unbounded. That would correspond to di¤erent subjects having a di¤erent number of tokens to invest in a stylized e¤ort design and thus in addition to the change in how e¤ort is modeled, these implementations also introduce heterogeneity in investment capability. The issue of di¤erential ability or di¤erential endowment has been investigated in the context of stylized e¤ort designs (e.g. Cherry, Krol, and Shogren (2005) ; Buckley and Croson (2006) ; Reuben and Riedl (2013) ) and not surprisingly these alterations to the environment can impact the results. For our purposes, we have to design our experiment to not introduce heterogeneity in this dimension.
Another di¤erence between real and stylized e¤ort experiments is the timing of the decisions. In the standard VCM, a subject must make a single decision about token allocation, i.e. choose how many tokens from 0-10 to contribute to the group account, and periods can go very quickly. In a real e¤ort version, subjects have to spend time on the real e¤ort task producing their tokens or their contributions to the accounts. The timing di¤erence could lead to a person becoming more or perhaps less thoughtful over their contribution choices, which could lead them to either be more or less cooperative. This element must also be eliminated as a di¤erence between treatments.
Real e¤ort tasks may also di¤er from stylized e¤ort at a cognitive level as engaging in the real e¤ort task will trigger additional cognitive processes that could distract a participant from the underlying incentives of the VCM. While the directional impact of such a distraction is unclear, it seems quite clear that contribution decisions could be impacted. This means that comparisons of real e¤ort to a stylized e¤ort, where subjects only choose contributions and are not also engaging in other cognitive tasks, will have another confound which we seek to eliminate in our design.
We explain how our design dealt with these issues by describing each of the three treatments, beginning with what we will refer to as the Useful E¤ort (UE) treatment. In the UE treatment, subjects are engaged in a data entry task in which they enter actual …nancial data from Reuters. This data is an important component of a research project of another faculty member at the university where the experiments were conducted (not a co-author on this project). In the instructions we explain to the subjects very clearly that the data entry task is vital to the research of this faculty member and exhort them to be careful in their work. 3 This was an attempt to have subjects truly see this as useful e¤ort and not some abstract real e¤ort task necessary only for the experiment.
Subjects earned a token by entering in a …ve-letter fund ticker, a two-letter fund code, 2 For example, Van Dijk, Sonnemans, and Van Winden (2001) had subjects solve two-variable optimization problems while Cooper and Saral (2013) use GMAT questions. In the …rst case, subjects were given two problems, task A and task B to work on. E¤ort on task B was analogous to donations to the individual account, while e¤ort on task A was (in some treatments) similar to the group account. In the second, subjects were asked to donate their answers to GMAT questions to either the individual account or the group account. 3 We thought carefully about whether and how to error check the entries, but all ways we came up with to do this caused other problems and confounds in the design. The possibility of errors in the data is a problem for the researcher who will be using the data and the capability to enter random nonsense could make the subjects take the task less seriously. Of course this is true of real data entry tasks as well so we decided to settle on not error checking in real time. and the 1-year, 5-year, and 10-year percentage returns from a sheet printed out with this information. An example of this data and how it is presented to subjects is shown in Figure  1 . Each line of data would earn a single token and all subjects were required to enter 10 lines per period so that they would earn 10 tokens per period. They were not able to earn more than 10 tokens per period and they could not advance to a new period without earning all 10. This insured that all subjects had the exact same investment capability in each period. It is also important that they did not earn their tokens and then make their investment decision at the end. Subjects would make their investment choices while generating the tokens using a toggle button on their screen. At the beginning of a period they would have to switch the toggle to either the private or group account and then any tokens they produced would go toward the selected account. They could switch the toggle at any point during a period between the accounts which allowed them to create any split they desired of the tokens between the two accounts. This means that they were essentially choosing which account to work for while producing tokens.
We will refer to our next treatment as the Trivial E¤ort (TE) treatment and it is conducted identically in all aspects to the previously described UE treatment except that the data subjects enter is presented to them with no context. Subjects in the TE treatment were handed identical data sheets to those in the UE treatment but there was no mention that the data would be used for any external purpose. They were only told that the reason to enter the data is to earn the tokens. To accomplish this, two copies of each data sheet were printed where one went to someone in the TE treatment and one went to someone in the UE treatment.
Designing a treatment to represent Stylized E¤ort (SE) which has the properties of a standard VCM but that di¤ers from the previous two treatments only by how the tokens are earned required us to design this treatment to be substantially di¤erent from a standard VCM. In this treatment, subjects receive tokens without requiring any e¤ort on their part and so there is no data entry task. In order to ensure that the timing issues were the same between this treatment and the others, subjects would still make their investment choices using the same toggle switch as in the other treatments but instead of earning the tokens through e¤ort, the tokens would arrive at random intervals. The token arrival times were drawn at random from the actual distribution of subject times to complete a data entry line from the UE and TE sessions. The average length of time between tokens was 22 seconds, with a maximum of 73 seconds and a minimum of 8. Subjects would receive a warning that a token was going to be deposited into the selected account 3 seconds before it was to allow them to change the current account to which tokens were accruing if they wanted to.
These design choices were made to ensure the timing and the nature of the decisions were the same across all three treatments. In order to give those in the SE treatment something to do while the tokens appeared that could stimulate some sort of cognitive processes, we allowed them to play Tic-Tac-Toe against a computer opponent for no earnings. We made it very clear that playing this game was not connected to earning tokens and that there were no earnings related to playing. Subjects could however have been just as distracted by playing this task as engaging in the data entry tasks causing them to be distracted from the VCM incentives. 4 The design of this experiment ensures that the costs of decisions are equivalent between treatments as the cost of working to generate a token to the group account is the earnings/utility given up that could have been generated by working to generate a token to the individual account and vice versa. One might argue that the real e¤ort tokens are more expensive to acquire than the stylized e¤ort tokens but that extra expense has no impact on the decision making margins for contributions as they wash out of the comparison. Further, the main component of cost in an experiment like this is probably the time cost of how long it takes to generate a token and this was common across all treatments. It is in this way that we have ensured costs are common between treatments. What our design does not do is guarantee equivalent utility functions across treatments. As we discussed above, the most compelling argument for why real e¤ort might generate di¤erent behavior than stylized e¤ort is the possibility that earning the tokens through real e¤ort could impact the utility functions the subjects have and in this case that would appear through their willingness to be cooperative and such depending on how the tokens are earned. Thus it is through this possible channel that one might expect di¤erences in behavior to emerge.
We conducted 2 sessions of all treatments. Groups of 4 were randomly formed at the start of each session and these groups remained constant throughout the session. All subjects were students at Ohio University and the experiment was programmed using Z-tree software, Fischbacher (2007) . 
Results
We begin the analysis of the results with a …rst look at the data in Figure 2 which shows average investment levels into the group account by period for all three treatments. Since our SE treatment is substantially di¤erent than a more traditional stylized e¤ort VCM we also include data in the …gure from two prior studies which use the more traditional design, Croson (2001) and Houser and Kurzban (2002) , and have the same parameterization as our design (MPCR = 0.5, n = 4, 10 periods, partner matching). The …gure shows that the results from all three of our treatments are very similar to each other and that all three show the standard pattern observed in other VCM experiments, i.e. contributions starting at a moderately high level and then decaying over time. Despite the design of our experiments being very di¤erent, it is also interesting to see that our data fall right in-line with the results observed in the more traditional stylized e¤ort designs from Croson (2001) and Houser and Kurzban (2002) . We also provide Table 2 which contains the values from only our data of the average contributions to the group account and their standard deviation for selected rounds. 5 The table provides additional evidence of the similarity between treatments -not only are the average levels of contributions similar between treatments but so too are the standard errors.
Given that contributions are not independent over time, we cannot test any formal hypotheses on these averages as any such test would be incorrectly speci…ed. We instead provide several di¤erent regression approaches for dealing with the interactions between group members and over time in Table 3 . The regressions are random e¤ects panel regressions where the dependent variable is the amount contributed to the group account. To account for the repeated observations across subjects, errors are clustered at the subject level. Observations are also not entirely independent across group members and so one might also want to cluster at the group level. The data contains only 22 groups which means that clustering at the group level may not satisfy the asymptotic properties of the estimator. As such, we don't choose this as our default speci…cation but we do provide the results for speci…cations using the Bias-Reducing Linearization (BRL) procedure (McCaffrey and Bell (2002)) to cluster at the group level which corrects for the small number of clusters. The qualitative results are unchanged by this alternative speci…cation. One might also be concerned about the potential for a censoring problem with the data since subjects could not contribute more than 10 (25% of token allocation decisions to the group were at the maximum of 10) or less than 0 (18% of token allocation decisions to the group were at the minimum of 0, which is the dominant strategy prediction). We therefore also include the results of a Tobit estimator with errors clustered at the subject level in the appendix and again, the qualitative results are unchanged.
Result 1 There are no statistically signi…cant di¤ erences in contributions between treatments.
Each of the regression speci…cations include dummy variables for the TE and UE treatments. These coe¢ cients allow us to test whether the average contributions are di¤erent between treatments. The …rst speci…cation includes only these dummy variables, and a constant, which provides a clean test for di¤erences between the overall contribution levels. Neither coe¢ cient is signi…cant which indicates that the contributions to the group account in TE and UE are not signi…cantly di¤erent from SE. Since the two coe¢ cients are opposite signs, it could be the case that the average level of contributions to the group account in TE and UE are di¤erent. A post-estimation Wald test yields a p value of 0:24 indicating that those two coe¢ cients are also not signi…cantly di¤erent from each other.
We also test whether there are di¤erences over time. Figure 2 indicated that the time paths look similar, but to test this observation formally the second speci…cation in Table 3 includes a time trend and interactions between that time trend and the treatments. This yields the second result.
Result 2 There are no statistically signi…cant di¤ erences between treatments in how contributions adjust across time.
In this speci…cation, the Period variable is negative and signi…cant indicating that, as in most other similar VCM data, there is a decay in contributions over time in the SE treatment. The interactions between Period and the two other treatments are insigni…cant and of the same sign indicating that the rate of decay is not di¤erent for any of our treatments. Post-estimation Wald tests con…rm no di¤erence in the decay (the interaction terms, p = 0:72) or the treatments after accounting for the decay (the binary variables for the UE and TE treatments, p = 0:51) for the two real-e¤ort treatments. 6 The last regression speci…cation examines how individuals respond to the average level of investment by their group members from the previous period. Many prior studies conclude that subjects often engage in conditional cooperation in VCMs; they are willing to cooperate if others also cooperate but contributions will decline if they do not see others contributing at their expected level. Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) demonstrate that this behavior can yield the standard decay pattern we observe over time. This speci…cation includes a lag of the average contribution by an individual's group members (Group t 1 ) to determine if we can see any di¤erences between treatments regarding how individuals react to the contribution levels of others. 7 This leads to our third result.
Result 3 There are no statistically signi…cant di¤ erences between treatments in how contributions adjust to contributions by group members.
Consistent with conditional cooperation behavior, the signi…cance of the lagged variable indicates that subjects do adjust their contributions based on the contributions of others. The interaction terms, however, are all insigni…cant which again con…rms that there are no di¤erences between treatments in regard to how individuals react to the contributions of others. Post-estimation Walt tests support the lack of a di¤erence between the TE and UE coe¢ cients (p = 0:86) or the interaction e¤ect (p = 0:91) between the two real-e¤ort treatments.
Conclusion
Our goal was to determine if the manner in which e¤ort is simulated in a lab experiment has signi…cant behavioral e¤ects. There are many claims in the literature that making the e¤ort task seem more …eld-like should enhance the external validity of the results, making them more credible. For that to be true, it should be the case that making the e¤ort more …eld-like should also have some direct impact on behavior. While the claim regarding external validity has been asserted many times in the literature, there is little in the way of empirical evidence to support it. Our results certainly do not provide such evidence.
We …nd that all three ways we model e¤ort provision in the lab, stylized, trivial and useful e¤ort, yield identical outcomes. Not only do we …nd the standard comparative static results common to all VCM experiments across treatments, i.e. initially moderate to high contributions to the public account which decline over time, but the levels of contributions across all three e¤ort designs are indistinguishable from each other. Given these results, it seems di¢ cult to advance a claim that the outcome of an experiment designed on the basis of any of the three e¤ort models should be considered as inherently more or less externally valid or …eld relevant than any of the others.
We should of course be careful about how our results are interpreted. Our results do not suggest that we should expect any real e¤ort experiment and any stylized e¤ort experiment to yield identical results. There are typically many di¤erences between real and stylized e¤ort designs other than the nature of how e¤ort is modeled which can impact the behavior. Most importantly, the underlying cost function can di¤er substantially between real and stylized e¤ort designs with the cost function in the real e¤ort design generally unknown and sometimes unknowable. There are also several other potential confounds in comparisons of real e¤ort to stylized e¤ort that our experiment was designed to eliminate, such as the di¤erences in timing of choices and the degree to which subjects were distracted by other tasks. What our results strongly suggest is that should someone observe a di¤erence in behavior between a real e¤ort and stylized e¤ort environment that it is not the nature of the e¤ort itself which is driving the di¤erences but rather it is these others di¤erences, such as di¤erential cost functions, which are driving the behavioral di¤erences.
These results should also be helpful to understand when real e¤ort and stylized e¤ort models might best be used. First, one should not decide between them on the false assumption that one is necessarily more …eld relevant than the other. A more reasonable basis for selecting between designs has to do with issues concerning the nature of the cost function in the real e¤ort design and the research question being addressed. If there are elements of the cost function for the real e¤ort task which cannot be replicated in an induced cost function yet are important to the issues being tested, then it certainly makes sense to use a real e¤ort design. This might involve situations in which an experimenter is trying to estimate some properties of the cost function or if there are some sort of demographic di¤erences in cost functions of a certain type that are a key interest in the research question. In the latter case, one has to be very careful about the real e¤ort task selected as di¤erent ones will have di¤erent properties and generate di¤erent demographic interactions. The real e¤ort task must be therefore chosen due to it possessing properties very similar to the …eld situation of interest and it must also be made clear the domains to which those results do and do not apply. On the other hand, should one of these speci…c issues not be a core element in the research question of the study, there does not seem to be a compelling argument to use a real e¤ort design due to the substantial control lost in doing so.
A valid question regarding our results is the degree to which they might transfer to other games. The trust game might be an important one to consider as it di¤ers in important ways from this public goods model. Games like this add in another dimension that we might refer to as real versus stylized consequences. In a real e¤ort trust game, one might think to implement it by paying subjects di¤erent ‡at wages to engage in a task (e.g. stu¢ ng envelopes) to determine if they respond to high level "gift" wages with higher e¤ort. In this case it may well matter substantially what entity is receiving the bene…ts of the labor because in addition to the subjects possessing some unknown cost for completing the task they also may receive utility due to some unknown utility function for completing the task on behalf of that entity. One could refer to the situation in which the bene…t of the labor accrues to some actual entity as one with real consequences. It would certainly be possible to conduct an experiment in which those consequences are modeled in a stylized manner by inducing utility from the bene…ts of the labor by paying the subjects money based on the labor and again, to the extent that the induced utility function matches the homegrown one then similar results should be expected. Which approach one uses here depends on what you want to test. If you want to examine the nature of these unknown utility functions then you would want to use a real consequences design. If, however, you wanted to understand how subjects respond to di¤erent versions of those consequences you could conduct the stylized consequences design. While a very di¤erent context, an example of both approaches is shown in Isaac, Pevnitskaya, and Salmon (2010) in which the authors investigate charity auctions in which the preferences for the charities are induced in a stylized manner to determine how well the behavior matches with the theoretical predictions and then in other treatments the preferences are induced by having the revenue go to an actual charity to determine if behavior changes in some way based on the homegrown utility functions. The relevant issues here turn out to be very similar to the issues we've investigated above regarding real versus stylized e¤ort and, in our view, the same design principles should translate between contexts.
The results from this study do not provide the answers to all relevant questions regarding where, when, and why someone should use a real or stylized e¤ort design in an experiment but we believe that these results do help to place the relevant questions into proper perspective and help to provide some guidance on important aspects of the question. As with all elements of an experimental design, one must pay careful attention to how the speci…c design choices one makes a¤ect the results and thought must be given to how re ‡ective those design choices are of the situation to which you wish to apply the results. Our view is that both stylized e¤ort and real e¤ort designs can and should be used with the nature of the underlying research question determining which is preferred. Also, both approaches should be considered to have equal external validity and generalizability though of course careful attention must always be paid to how broadly one attempts to generalize the results of any data driven exercise. 
